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Chapter 9 Colonialism And The Countryside
Introduction
This chapter explores the impact of colonial rule on the rural populations of India during the period when the English East India Company (E.I.C.) established its authority, known as the 'Company Raj'. We will examine how the E.I.C. implemented new revenue policies and what these meant for different sections of rural society.
Colonial laws had significant consequences, affecting land ownership, wealth distribution, and social hierarchies. They influenced who gained or lost land, who became richer or poorer, and how peasants accessed resources like money.
However, the rural populace did not passively accept these changes. People actively resisted the new laws and regulations based on their own ideas of justice and fairness. This resistance shaped the actual implementation and impact of colonial laws.
Our understanding of this period is derived from various historical sources found in official archives: revenue records and surveys, journals and accounts of surveyors and travellers, and reports from official enquiry commissions.
Bengal And The Zamindars
Colonial rule was first established in Bengal. Consequently, this region saw the earliest attempts by the British to transform rural society, introducing new systems of land rights and revenue collection. Understanding these early changes is key to comprehending the wider impact of colonialism.
An Auction In Burdwan
In 1797, a significant public auction took place in Burdwan. Numerous estates (mahals) belonging to the Raja of Burdwan were being sold to recover unpaid revenue. This was a direct consequence of the Permanent Settlement, introduced in 1793, which fixed the revenue each zamindar had to pay to the East India Company in perpetuity. When zamindars failed to make these payments, their estates were auctioned.
A peculiar outcome of the Burdwan auction was that many of the successful bidders were found to be servants and agents of the Raja, purchasing the properties on his behalf. Ultimately, over 95% of the sales were not genuine. The Raja's estates were formally sold but he managed to retain control of his zamindari through these manipulated transactions.
This event raises questions about the reasons for the Raja's failure to pay revenue, the identity of the purchasers, and the broader implications for rural eastern India under early Company rule.
The term Raja, meaning king, was often used informally to refer to powerful zamindars, reflecting their significant status and influence.
The Problem Of Unpaid Revenue
The auction of the Burdwan raj estates was not an isolated incident. Following the Permanent Settlement, over 75% of zamindaris in Bengal changed hands through sales. The Permanent Settlement was intended by British officials to solve the issues they faced since conquering Bengal. The rural economy in Bengal was in distress by the 1770s due to famines and declining output. Officials believed that securing property rights and fixing revenue rates permanently would encourage investment in agriculture, stimulating production, trade, and state revenue.
Under this system, the Company would receive a regular flow of revenue, and investors (zamindars and others) would be motivated to improve land knowing profits wouldn't be taxed away by increasing revenue demands. The hope was that this would lead to the rise of a class of enterprising landowners loyal to the British. However, the challenge was identifying who these individuals would be and ensuring they could consistently pay the fixed revenue.
After much debate, the Permanent Settlement was made with the existing rajas and taluqdars of Bengal, classifying them as zamindars. They were now defined as state revenue collectors, not landowners of the entire estate, who had to pay a revenue demand fixed in perpetuity. A zamindari estate comprised several villages (sometimes up to 400). The Company fixed the total revenue demand for the entire estate, which the zamindar contracted to pay. The zamindar collected rent from villagers (ryots), paid the fixed revenue to the Company, and kept the remaining amount as income. Failure to pay the fixed revenue meant the estate could be auctioned.
Taluqdar literally means someone who holds a taluq (a connection or territorial unit).
Why Zamindars Defaulted On Payments
Contrary to the British expectation that the Permanent Settlement would provide security and encourage improvement, zamindars frequently defaulted on revenue payments in the early years, leading to accumulated arrears. Several factors contributed to this:
- High Initial Demand: The revenue demand was set very high to compensate the Company for not being able to claim a share of potential future increases in agricultural income due to rising prices and cultivation expansion.
- Depressed Agricultural Prices: The high demand was imposed in the 1790s when prices of agricultural produce were low, making it difficult for ryots (peasants) to pay rent to the zamindars, who in turn struggled to pay the Company.
- Inflexible Collection: The revenue had to be paid punctually, regardless of harvest quality. The Sunset Law stipulated that if payment wasn't made by sunset on the due date, the zamindari was liable for auction.
- Limited Zamindar Power: The Permanent Settlement initially curtailed the zamindars' authority to collect rent and manage their estates. The Company disbanded their troops, abolished customs duties they collected, and placed their courts (cutcheries) under the supervision of Company-appointed Collectors. Zamindars lost control over local justice and police, with the Collectorate emerging as a rival power centre.
Rent collection became a constant struggle for zamindars. Ryots sometimes delayed payments due to poor harvests, low prices, or deliberately, encouraged by powerful rich peasants (jotedars) and village headmen (mandals). Zamindars could sue defaulters, but the legal process was slow, leading to massive backlogs of pending cases.
Ryot is the term used in British records for raiyat or peasant. In Bengal, ryots sometimes leased land to under-ryots instead of cultivating it directly.
The Rise Of The Jotedars
While many zamindars faced hardship, a new class of rich peasants, known as jotedars, gained prominence in villages, particularly in North Bengal (described vividly in Francis Buchanan's survey of Dinajpur). By the early 19th century, jotedars owned large areas of land, controlled local trade and moneylending, and held considerable power over poorer cultivators (Fig. 9.4 shows a house possibly belonging to a jotedar).
Much of jotedars' land was cultivated by sharecroppers (adhiyars or bargadars) who provided their own equipment and gave half the produce to the jotedar. Jotedars' power in villages often surpassed that of zamindars because they resided locally and had direct control over poor villagers.
They actively resisted zamindari efforts to increase revenue demands, obstructed zamindari officials, mobilised dependent ryots to delay payments, and were often purchasers when zamindari estates were auctioned for default (Source 1 describes jotedar resistance).
Source 1. The jotedars of Dinajpur
Buchanan described the ways in which the jotedars of Dinajpur in North Bengal resisted being disciplined by the zamindar and undermined his power:
Landlords do not like this class of men, but it is evident that they are absolutely necessary, unless the landlords themselves would advance money to their necessitous tenantry …
The jotedars who cultivate large portions of lands are very refractory, and know that the zamindars have no power over them. They pay only a few rupees on account of their revenue and then fall in balance almost every kist (instalment), they hold more lands than they are entitled to by their pottahs (deeds of contract). Should the zamindar’s officers, in consequence, summon them to the cutcherry, and detain them for one or two hours with a view to reprimand them, they immediately go and complain at the Fouzdarry Thanna (police station) for imprisonment and at the munsiff ’s (a judicial officer at the lower court) cutcherry for being dishonoured and whilst the causes continue unsettled, they instigate the petty ryots not to pay their revenue consequently …
Answer:
According to Buchanan, the jotedars resisted the authority of the zamindars in several ways:
- Delayed and Partial Payments: They intentionally paid only small amounts towards their revenue obligations and allowed arrears to accumulate regularly ("pay only a few rupees... fall in balance almost every kist").
- Holding Excess Land: They cultivated more land than legally permitted by their contracts ("hold more lands than they are entitled to").
- Defiance of Authority: They were "very refractory" and were aware that the zamindars had limited direct power over them.
- Legal Counter-Action: If summoned or detained by zamindar officials, they immediately filed complaints at police stations and lower courts ("complain at the Fouzdarry Thanna... for imprisonment and... at the munsiff’s cutcherry for being dishonoured"), using the colonial legal system to harass and obstruct the zamindar.
- Mobilising Dependent Ryots: While their legal cases were pending, they instigated smaller peasants (petty ryots) who were dependent on them (possibly through loans or sharecropping) not to pay their rent to the zamindar ("instigate the petty ryots not to pay their revenue").
These actions collectively undermined the zamindar's ability to collect revenue, enforce contracts, and exert authority in the village, contributing to their financial difficulties and weakening their position.
While most powerful in North Bengal, rich peasants with similar influence were emerging elsewhere, known by different names like haoladars, gantidars, or mandals. Their rise directly diminished zamindari power.
Fig. 9.5 illustrates the power structures in rural Bengal. The arrows represent the flow of rent/revenue and other transactions.
Correct Labels for Fig. 9.5:
- Company <- revenue <- Zamindar
- Zamindar <- rent <- Ryot
- Jotedar -> loan -> Ryot
- Jotedar -> interest <- Ryot (on loans)
- Jotedar <- produce <- Ryot (from cultivation/sharecropping)
- Ryot <- rent <- Under-ryot
The Zamindars Resist
Despite the challenges, the authority of zamindars did not completely disappear. They developed strategies to survive the pressures of high revenue demands and potential estate auctions. Fictitious sales became a key tactic.
This involved several steps. The Raja of Burdwan, for example, first transferred parts of his zamindari to his mother to protect it from auction, as women's property was exempted by the Company. Then, his agents manipulated the public auctions. They deliberately withheld revenue payments, allowing arrears to grow. When the estate was put up for auction, the Raja's men would be the highest bidders (making benami purchases, anonymous transactions). They would then fail to pay the purchase money, forcing the Company to re-auction the estate. This cycle of auction, purchase by agents, non-payment, and re-auction would be repeated, eventually exhausting other bidders and forcing the estate's sale at a low price back to the zamindar. This meant the zamindar rarely paid the full revenue demanded, and the Company struggled to recover arrears.
These benami transactions occurred on a large scale, with big zamindaris using this method. Zamindars also resisted the physical takeover of auctioned estates by outsiders. Agents of new buyers were sometimes attacked by the former zamindar's strongmen (lathyals). Ryots themselves occasionally resisted outsiders, feeling loyalty to their original zamindar whom they saw as their authority figure (proja, subjects). The sale disrupted their sense of identity.
By the early 19th century, agricultural prices rose, and revenue rules became somewhat more flexible for survivors, strengthening zamindar power. However, their authority ultimately collapsed during the Great Depression of the 1930s, allowing jotedars to consolidate power fully (Fig. 9.6 shows Maharaja Mehtab Chand, a zamindar who prospered later, and Fig. 9.7 shows palace ruins symbolising the end of the era).
Benami: Literally "anonymous," referring to transactions made in a false name, with the real owner hidden.
Lathyal: A strongman or enforcer employed by a zamindar.
The Fifth Report
Many changes in rural Bengal under colonial rule were documented in a report submitted to the British Parliament in 1813. Known as the Fifth Report, it was part of a series on the East India Company's administration in India. This massive report included appendices containing petitions from zamindars and ryots, Collector reports, revenue statistics, and notes on administration.
The Company's activities in India were closely scrutinised in Britain from the mid-1760s. Groups opposing the Company's monopoly wanted a share in the lucrative India trade. British industrialists sought to access the Indian market for their goods. Political groups argued that only the Company, not the nation, benefited from the conquest of Bengal. Accounts of Company corruption and misrule were widely publicised. The British Parliament passed laws to regulate the Company, demanding reports and establishing enquiry committees. The Fifth Report was the product of one such Select Committee and heavily influenced parliamentary debates on Company rule.
For over a century and a half, the Fifth Report shaped the understanding of late 18th-century rural Bengal. While containing invaluable evidence, official reports must be read critically, considering the author's perspective and purpose. Recent research using zamindari archives and local records indicates that the Fifth Report, aiming to criticise Company maladministration, exaggerated the decline of zamindari power and land loss. As seen earlier, zamindars used ingenious methods to resist displacement (Source 2 provides excerpts from the Fifth Report).
Source 2. From the Fifth Report
Referring to the condition of zamindars and the auction of lands, the Fifth Report stated:
The revenue was not realised with punctuality, and lands to a considerable extent were periodically exposed to sale by auction. In the native year 1203, corresponding with 1796-97, the land advertised for sale comprehended a jumma or assessment of sicca rupees 28,70,061, the extent of land actually sold bore a jumma or assessment of 14,18,756, and the amount of purchase money sicca rupees 17,90,416. In 1204, corresponding with 1797-98, the land advertised was for sicca rupees 26,66,191, the quantity sold was for sicca rupees 22,74,076, and the purchase money sicca rupees 21,47,580. Among the defaulters were some of the oldest families of the country. Such were the rajahs of Nuddea, Rajeshaye, Bishenpore (all districts of Bengal), … and others, the dismemberment of whose estates at the end of each succeeding year, threatened them with poverty and ruin, and in some instances presented difficulties to the revenue officers, in their efforts to preserve undiminished the amount of public assessment.
Answer:
The tone of the report is formal and official. Evidence is presented with specific figures (jumma, area sold, purchase money) and names of prominent defaulters (Rajahs). The attitude is concerned and somewhat critical of the situation, but primarily from the perspective of the state's difficulty in collecting revenue. It notes the lack of punctuality, the need for frequent auctions, and the threat to old families, but frames these as problems for "revenue officers" in maintaining "the amount of public assessment."
The Report is trying to convey that the Permanent Settlement, while intended to ensure regular revenue, was facing significant implementation problems. It highlights the widespread default by even established zamindars and the large scale of land sales as evidence of the system's failure to secure prompt payment and the resulting instability it caused for both the state's finances and the landed class.
A problem in making long-term generalisations from figures covering only two years (1796-97 and 1797-98) is that these years might not be representative of the entire period. Revenue collection and land sales could fluctuate significantly based on various factors like agricultural output, price changes, specific local issues, or policy adjustments made later. Relying only on a snapshot of two years might lead to an overstatement of the long-term trend or the severity of the crisis throughout the duration of the Permanent Settlement.
The Hoe And The Plough
Beyond the wetlands of Bengal, we look at the drier Rajmahal hills, a region of shifting cultivation and forest subsistence. This section explores the changes brought about by the expansion of the peasant economy into these areas and the resulting conflicts.
In The Hills Of Rajmahal
In the early 19th century, Francis Buchanan (a physician and surveyor, Source on Buchanan) travelled through the Rajmahal hills, finding the area difficult to penetrate and its inhabitants (the Paharias) hostile or evasive. His journal provides glimpses of their life. The Paharias were known from late 18th-century revenue records. They lived around the Rajmahal hills, depending on forest produce and practising shifting cultivation. They cleared forest patches by cutting and burning vegetation, cultivated pulses and millets on the ash-enriched soil for a few years using hoes, then left the land fallow and moved on.
Their lives were deeply connected to the forest, providing food (mahua), products for sale (silk cocoons, resin, wood for charcoal), and pasture (undergrowth, fallow land). They saw the entire region as their land, central to their identity and survival, and resisted outsiders. Chiefs maintained group unity, settled disputes, and led in conflicts (Figs 9.8 and 9.9 depict Rajmahal hills and Paharia life).
From their hill base, the Paharias raided settled agricultural villages in the plains for survival (especially in lean years), asserting power, and negotiating relations. Zamindars paid tribute for peace, and traders paid tolls for using passes controlled by Paharia chiefs, who in turn protected them. This fragile peace broke down in the late 18th century as settled agriculture expanded aggressively due to British encouragement. Zamindars and jotedars cleared forests for rice fields to increase land revenue, produce for export, and establish 'ordered society'. The British viewed forests as wild and forest people as unruly, needing to be 'tamed' into plough agriculture.
As settled agriculture reduced forest and pasture land, conflict intensified. Paharias raided more frequently. British attempts to control them initially involved brutal extermination policies (1770s), followed by a pacification policy (1780s) by Augustus Cleveland, offering annual allowances to chiefs for maintaining order. Many chiefs refused; those who accepted lost authority and were seen as paid subordinates.
Paharias withdrew deeper into the mountains, resisting British intrusion and the loss of their way of life. Buchanan's visit in 1810-11 was met with suspicion due to the memory of these policies. Simultaneously, a new threat arrived: Santhals migrated into the area, clearing forests, cultivating land with ploughs, and displacing Paharias from the lower hills. The hoe (Paharia shifting cultivation) versus the plough (Santhal settled agriculture) became a symbol of this conflict.
The Santhals: Pioneer Settlers
Buchanan noted the transformation of the landscape around a village near Ganjuria Pahar (part of Rajmahal hills) in 1810, attributing the recent forest clearance and expanded cultivation to the Santhals. He saw this as making the area potentially "glorious." Santhals had begun arriving in Bengal around the 1780s, hired by zamindars and invited by British officials to reclaim land, particularly after failing to subdue the Paharias and make them settled agriculturists. The Paharias resisted plough agriculture and remained turbulent; the Santhals, by contrast, seemed ideal settlers eager to clear land and cultivate (Fig. 9.10 depicts a Santhal village).
Santhals were granted land in the Rajmahal foothills. By 1832, a large area called Damin-i-Koh was demarcated for them, enclosed by boundary pillars, separating them from both settled cultivators and Paharias. The grant required clearing and cultivating at least one-tenth of the land within ten years. Santhal settlements and population grew rapidly in Damin-i-Koh, increasing revenue for the Company. Santhal myths reflect a history of mobility, finding a temporary end in Damin-i-Koh.
As Santhals settled, Paharias were pushed deeper into the hills, losing access to fertile lower lands and forests, which severely impacted their traditional subsistence methods (shifting cultivation, hunting, gathering). Santhals adopted settled agriculture, cultivating commercial crops, and engaging with traders and moneylenders.
However, the Santhals soon faced new problems. The state imposed heavy taxes on their cleared land. Moneylenders (dikus, outsiders) charged high interest, taking over land for unpaid debts. Zamindars also tried to assert control over the Damin area. By the 1850s, feeling oppressed, the Santhals revolted (1855-56) against these groups and the colonial state, aiming to create their own autonomous rule (Fig. 9.11 shows a leader, Fig. 9.12 shows fighting, Figs 9.13 and 9.14 show aftermath).
Following the revolt, the colonial state created the Santhal Pargana in 1857, a separate territory with special laws, hoping to pacify the Santhals.
Dikus: A term used by Santhals for outsiders, particularly moneylenders and traders who exploited them.
The Accounts Of Buchanan
Francis Buchanan's reports, while valuable, reflect his position as an employee of the British East India Company. His extensive surveys were funded by the Company, requiring him to collect specific information for its benefit. He travelled with a large retinue and was perceived by locals as an agent of the government (sarkar).
The Company sought to identify and exploit natural resources. Buchanan meticulously observed geological features, minerals, and local practices related to resource extraction (Source 4 gives an example of his geological observations). He described landscapes not just as they were, but in terms of their potential for economic transformation and increased productivity (Source 5 exemplifies his ideas on improving cultivation). His vision was shaped by the Company's commercial interests and Western notions of progress.
Source 4. The rocks near Kaduya
Buchanan’s journal is packed with observations like the following:
About a mile farther on, (I) came to a low ledge of rocks without any evident strata; it is a small grained granite with reddish feldspar, with quartz and black mica … More than half a mile from thence, I came to another rock not stratified, and consisting of very finegrained granite with yellowish feldspar, whitish quartz and black mica.
Answer:
This excerpt shows Buchanan's keen interest in the geological composition and potential economic value of the landscape. He is meticulously documenting the type of rock (granite), its texture (small grained, fine-grained), and its mineral components (feldspar, quartz, mica) and their colours. This level of detail suggests a scientific approach to surveying the land, likely aimed at identifying valuable resources or understanding soil composition for agricultural purposes. His observations are precise and systematic, indicating his trained eye as a surveyor tasked with assessing the potential of the territory for the East India Company.
Source 3. Buchanan on the Santhals
Buchanan wrote:
They are very clever in clearing new lands, but live meanly. Their huts have no fence, and the walls are made of small sticks placed upright, close together and plastered within with clay. They are small and slovenly, and too flat-roofed, with very little arch.
Answer:
This description reveals Buchanan's bias against the Santhals' lifestyle and dwellings, reflecting his perspective rooted in Western notions of proper housing and living standards. He acknowledges their skill in clearing land ("very clever in clearing new lands") but immediately qualifies it by stating they "live meanly." His detailed description of their huts ("no fence," "small sticks... plastered with clay," "small and slovenly," "too flat-roofed," "very little arch") focuses on their perceived simplicity and lack of sophistication compared to perhaps more permanent or elaborately constructed dwellings he was accustomed to. The terms "meanly" and "slovenly" clearly indicate a negative judgment based on his own cultural standards, viewing their housing as inferior rather than practical or appropriate for their way of life at the time.
Source 5. On clearance and settled cultivation
Passing through one village in the lower Rajmahal hills, Buchanan wrote:
The view of the country is exceedingly fine, the cultivation, especially the narrow valleys of rice winding in all directions, the cleared lands with scattered trees, and the rocky hills are in perfection; all that is wanted is some appearance of progress in the area and a vastly extended and improved cultivation, of which the country is highly susceptible.
Plantations of Asan and Palas, for Tessar (Tassar silk worms) and Lac, should occupy the place of woods to as great an extent as the demand will admit; the remainder might be all cleared, and the greater part cultivated, while what is not fit for the purpose, might rear Plamira (palmyra) and Mowa (mahua).
Answer:
Buchanan's description reveals his ideas of development are centred on economic productivity, commercial exploitation of resources, and transforming the landscape according to market demands and what he considered "improved" cultivation. He sees the potential of the land for "vastly extended and improved cultivation," not just the existing fine scenery. He explicitly suggests replacing existing woods with plantations of commercially valuable trees (Asan, Palas for silk and lac) wherever demand allows. Any remaining land not suitable for cultivation should be used for other specific crops (Palmyra, Mahua). This shows development means maximising output for trade and revenue, aligning with the Company's commercial interests.
If I were a Paharia forest dweller, I would likely react negatively and with alarm to these ideas. My way of life depended on the forest as it was, not on its clearance or transformation into plantations and cultivated fields. Clearing the forest means destroying my home, my source of food (gathering, hunting), my pasture for cattle, and the basis of my shifting cultivation. Turning woods into commercial plantations or fields directly threatens my subsistence and mobility. The idea of my landscape being "improved" by outsiders for their gain, without regard for my traditional practices and connection to the forest, would be perceived as an aggressive intrusion and a direct attack on my livelihood and identity.
Buchanan was critical of forest dwellers' lifestyles, advocating for the transformation of forests into agricultural land, reflecting his perspective influenced by colonial goals and European ideas of progress.
A Revolt In The Countryside The Bombay Deccan
Moving to western India, we examine events in the Bombay Deccan, focusing on a peasant revolt in 1875. Revolts offer insights into the rebels' grievances, exposing hidden aspects of their lives and the causes of their suffering. They also generate official records as authorities investigate to restore order and formulate policies.
Across India in the 19th century, peasants often rebelled against moneylenders and grain dealers. The Deccan revolt was one such instance.
Account Books Are Burnt
The revolt started on 12 May 1875 in Supa, a market village in Poona district. Ryots (peasants) from surrounding areas attacked shopkeepers and moneylenders, demanding their account books (bahi khatas) and debt bonds. They destroyed these documents by burning them (Fig. 9.12 visually depicts conflict, possibly reflecting this), looted grain shops, and sometimes set fire to moneylenders' houses (sahukars).
The revolt spread rapidly over 6,500 sq km, affecting over thirty villages with the same pattern of attacking sahukars, burning records, and destroying bonds. Terrified sahukars fled, leaving property behind (Source 6 describes the incident in Supa, Source 7 is a newspaper report).
Source 6. On that day in Supa
On 16 May 1875, the District Magistrate of Poona wrote to the Police Commissioner:
On arrival at Supa on Saturday 15 May I learnt of the disturbance. One house of a moneylender was burnt down; about a dozen were forcibly broken into and completely gutted of their content. Account papers, bonds, grains, country cloth were burnt in the street where heaps of ashes are still to be seen. The chief constable apprehended 50 persons. Stolen property worth Rs 2000 was recovered. The estimated loss is over Rs 25,000. Moneylenders claim it is over Rs 1 lakh.
Answer:
This source is a report from the District Magistrate, an official. The language reflects an official perspective concerned with law and order and quantifying losses ("disturbance," "forcibly broken into," "completely gutted," "apprehended 50 persons," "Stolen property worth Rs 2000 was recovered," "estimated loss," "claim it is over Rs 1 lakh"). It describes the events factually but within a framework of crime and loss, focusing on the disruption of state control and private property.
A ryot describing the same situation would likely focus on the motivations behind the actions and the grievances against the moneylenders rather than just the criminal aspect and material loss. They might describe the moneylenders as exploiters who trapped them in debt through unfair practices, the account books and bonds as instruments of oppression, and the burning of these documents as an act of liberation or protest against injustice. They would emphasize the desperation that drove them to revolt and frame the actions as a righteous response to intolerable suffering caused by excessive debt and exploitation. The looting of grain might be described as reclaiming what was rightfully theirs or necessary for survival after deprivation caused by debt.
Source 7. A newspaper report
The following report, titled ‘The ryot and the moneylender’, appeared in the Native Opinion (6 June 1876), and was quoted in Report of the Native Newspapers of Bombay:
They (the ryots) first place spies on the boundaries of their villages to see if any Government officers come, and to give timely intimation of their arrival to the offenders. They then assemble in a body and go to the houses of their creditors, and demand from them a surrender of their bonds and other documents, and threaten them in case of refusal with assault and plunder. If any Government officer happens to approach the villages where the above is taking place, the spies give intimation to the offenders and the latter disperse in time.
Answer:
The words and terms indicating prejudices of the writer (presumably a commentator observing from a distance or reflecting official/elite views) include:
- "offenders": This term frames the rebelling ryots as lawbreakers and criminals, pre-judging their actions negatively rather than exploring their grievances.
- "creditors": While technically accurate, using only this term without acknowledging the exploitative practices described elsewhere in the chapter simplifies the complex relationship.
- "assault and plunder": This describes the actions in purely criminal terms, focusing on violence and theft without considering the context of debt and desperation.
- "spies": This term suggests the ryots' organised resistance is a form of clandestine, perhaps deceitful, activity.
A ryot of the area would have described the same situation using terms that reflect their sense of injustice and motivation. For instance, they might refer to the moneylenders as "oppressors" or "exploiters." The "bonds and documents" would be called "instruments of enslavement" or "false papers." Their actions would be described as "demanding back what was stolen from us," "fighting against injustice," or "taking necessary action because the government offered no help." They might describe their lookouts not as "spies" but as "guards" or "watchmen" protecting their community from the authorities who sided with the moneylenders. The gathering would be a form of collective action or protest, not merely "assembling in a body."
British officials, fearing a repeat of the 1857 revolt, deployed troops and arrested hundreds. Bringing the situation under control took months. The burning of bonds and deeds indicates that the core issue was debt and exploitation by moneylenders. Examining the history of agrarian changes in the Deccan over the 19th century helps explain this revolt.
Sahukar: A term used for moneylenders and sometimes traders.
Bahi Khatas: Account books.
A New Revenue System
As British rule expanded beyond Bengal, different revenue systems were introduced. The Permanent Settlement was not widely implemented elsewhere. This was partly because rising agricultural prices after 1810 increased the income of Bengal zamindars (under Permanent Settlement), and the state couldn't claim a share of this increase. Seeking to maximise revenue, the Company opted for temporary settlements in annexed territories.
Policy formulation was influenced by contemporary economic theories. By the 1820s, David Ricardo's ideas were influential. Colonial officials in Maharashtra, influenced by Ricardian theory, believed the state should tax any agricultural surplus above the "average rent," arguing that otherwise, cultivators would become rentiers unwilling to invest in improvement. They saw Bengal zamindars as examples of such rentiers.
The revenue system introduced in the Bombay Deccan was the ryotwari settlement. Revenue was settled directly with the ryot (cultivator). The system involved estimating average income based on soil type, assessing the ryot's capacity to pay, and fixing a proportion as the state's share. Lands were resurveyed every 30 years, and revenue rates were increased, making the demand non-permanent.
Ryotwari settlement: A land revenue system where revenue was collected directly from the cultivator (ryot).
Rentier: A person who lives primarily on rental income from property.
Revenue Demand And Peasant Debt
The initial ryotwari settlement in the Bombay Deccan in the 1820s imposed extremely high revenue demands, leading some peasants to abandon their villages. This was particularly severe in areas with poor soil and unpredictable rainfall. When harvests failed, paying revenue was impossible. However, collectors aggressively pursued payment to demonstrate efficiency, seizing crops and fining entire villages for defaults.
The situation worsened in the 1830s. Agricultural prices fell sharply after 1832, reducing peasant income. A devastating famine (1832-34) further ravaged the region, causing massive loss of life and livestock, and leaving survivors with no agricultural stocks. Unpaid revenue arrears accumulated.
To survive and meet obligations (revenue, consumption, agricultural needs, social expenses), cultivators had to borrow from moneylenders. Once a loan was taken, especially given the high demands and fluctuating income, peasants found it difficult to repay. Mounting debt increased their dependence on moneylenders, requiring loans even for daily needs and farming expenses. By the 1840s, officials noted alarming levels of peasant indebtedness.
An economic recovery began in the mid-1840s. Officials started acknowledging the harshness of the earlier settlements and moderated revenue demands to encourage cultivation expansion. Agricultural prices recovered after 1845, leading peasants to increase their cultivated area. However, this expansion required more capital for ploughs, cattle, seeds, and land, pushing them back to moneylenders for loans.
Then Came The Cotton Boom
Before the 1860s, the UK imported most of its raw cotton from the USA. Concerned about this dependence, British cotton manufacturers sought alternative sources, viewing India as a potential major supplier due to its suitable conditions and cheap labor. The Cotton Supply Association and Manchester Cotton Company were formed in Britain to promote cotton production globally, specifically targeting India.
The American Civil War, which began in 1861, drastically cut off American cotton supplies to Britain (imports fell to less than 3%). This created a massive demand for Indian cotton. Cotton merchants in Bombay rushed to districts to secure supplies and encourage cultivation, offering advances to urban sahukars, who in turn provided credit to rural moneylenders who could guarantee supply (Fig. 9.15 shows the cotton price boom).
During this cotton boom, credit flowed easily to Deccan ryots, who received large advances (e.g., Rs 100 per acre for cotton). Moneylenders were eager to provide long-term loans, confident in repayment due to soaring prices. Cotton production in the Bombay Deccan doubled between 1860 and 1864, and by 1862, India supplied over 90% of British cotton imports (Figs 9.16, 9.17, 9.18, 9.19 depict cotton transport during the boom).
However, this boom did not universally benefit cotton producers; for most, it resulted in heavier debt, though some rich peasants profited.
Credit Dries Up
The dreams of Indian cotton merchants dominating the world market ended with the American Civil War's conclusion in 1865. American cotton production revived, and Indian cotton exports to Britain rapidly declined. Cotton prices plummeted.
Export merchants and sahukars in Maharashtra lost confidence in the Indian cotton market. Demand fell, prices dropped, and they stopped extending long-term credit, demanding repayment of existing debts. Simultaneously, the time came for the next revenue settlement (30 years after the first). The new demand was significantly increased (50% to 100%). Ryots faced impossible conditions: falling prices, decreased cotton cultivation, tight credit, and massively increased revenue demands. They turned to moneylenders again, but loans were refused due to lack of confidence in repayment capacity.
The Experience Of Injustice
The refusal of loans by moneylenders ignited the anger of the ryots. Their fury stemmed not just from debt and dependence but from the moneylenders' perceived violation of customary norms. While moneylending existed before colonial rule and moneylenders were powerful, customary rules limited interest rates (e.g., interest couldn't exceed the principal).
Under colonial rule, these norms broke down. The Deccan Riots Commission found cases where exorbitant interest (e.g., Rs 2,000 interest on a Rs 100 loan) was charged, violating customary limits. Ryots petitioned, complaining of such injustices.
Moneylenders were seen as manipulative and deceitful, forging accounts and using laws to exploit peasants (Source 8 is a petition detailing complaints).
Source 8. A ryot petitions
This is an example of a petition from a ryot of the village of Mirajgaon, Taluka Karjat, to the Collector, Ahmednagar, Deccan Riots Commission:
The sowkars (sahukars ) … have of late begun to oppress us. As we cannot earn enough to defray our household expenses, we are actually forced to beg of them to provide us with money, clothes and grain, which we obtain from them not without great difficulty, nor without their compelling us to enter into hard conditions in the bond. Moreover the necessary clothes and grain are not sold to us at cash rates. The prices asked from us are generally twenty-five or fifty per cent more than demanded from customers making ready money payments … The produce of our fields is also taken by the sowkars, who at the time of removing it assure us that it will be credited to our account, but they do not actually make any mention of it in the accounts. They also refuse to pass us any receipts for the produce so removed by them.
Answer:
The complaints the ryot is making in the petition include:
- Oppression by sahukars.
- Being forced to borrow for basic necessities (money, clothes, grain) due to inability to earn enough.
- Obtaining loans/supplies with great difficulty and under harsh bond conditions.
- Being charged inflated prices (25-50% more than cash rates) for goods received on credit.
- Moneylenders taking the produce from their fields, promising to credit it to the account, but failing to do so.
- Moneylenders refusing to provide receipts for the produce they take.
The harvest taken by the moneylenders was likely not credited to the peasants' account, or only partially credited at very low prices, to inflate the outstanding debt. By not crediting the value of the produce, the moneylender kept the peasant perpetually in debt and continued charging interest on a larger principal than was truly owed. This was a method of manipulating accounts to increase profit and control over the peasant.
Peasants were likely not given receipts for produce or loan repayments to prevent them from having any evidence of payment. Without receipts, the moneylender could deny receiving payments, claim the debt was larger, and enforce these claims through manipulated account books and legal bonds, ensuring the peasant remained indebted and vulnerable.
If I were a moneylender justifying these practices (from a perspective of self-interest and exploiting the system), I might give reasons such as: high risk in lending to peasants, especially during uncertain times; the need to cover costs and ensure profit given the risks; that taking produce and not giving receipts is a traditional way of settling accounts in the village (a false claim to legitimise manipulation); or that the peasant's illiteracy means written records are less reliable anyway (again, used to justify manipulation). The core motivation would be maximising profit and control over the peasant through debt, exploiting their vulnerability and lack of legal knowledge within the colonial legal framework.
In 1859, the British introduced a Limitation Law limiting the validity of loan bonds to three years to curb interest accumulation. However, moneylenders exploited this, forcing peasants to sign new bonds every three years, where unpaid debt and accumulated interest were added to the principal. This trapped peasants in escalating debt cycles (Source 10 is a petition describing this).
Source 10. How debts mounted
In a petition to the Deccan Riots Commission a ryot explained how the system of loans worked:
A sowkar lends his debtor Rs 100 on bond at Rs 3-2 annas per cent per mensem. The latter agrees to pay the amount within eight days from the passing of the bond. Three years after the stipulated time for repaying the amount, the sowkar takes from his debtor another bond for the principal and interest together at the same rate of interest, and allows him 125 days’ time to liquidate the debt. After the lapse of 3 years and 15 days a third bond is passed by the debtor … (this process is repeated) at the end of 12 years … his interest on Rs 1000 amounts to Rs 2028 -10 annas -3 paise.
Answer:
The initial interest rate stated is Rs 3 and 2 annas per cent per mensem. Since 1 rupee = 16 annas, 3 rupees and 2 annas is equivalent to $3 + \frac{2}{16} = 3.125$ rupees. The rate is $3.125\% $ per mensem.
Per annum, this rate is $3.125\% \times 12 = 37.5\% $.
This calculation is based on the stated rate per mensem. However, the petition describes a process where a new bond is signed every three years, adding accumulated interest to the principal. This process of compounding interest would lead to the debt growing much faster than simple interest calculation would suggest, especially if the interest was calculated monthly and then compounded every three years. The petition's final statement about Rs 2028-10-3 interest on Rs 1000 over 12 years ($202.85\% $ interest over 12 years, simple interest rate $\approx 16.9\% $ per year) suggests a complex and possibly manipulated calculation, potentially using the initial high monthly rate for shorter periods or through frequent compounding. The actual effective interest rate would escalate rapidly due to the compounding and manipulation of the principal amount every three years.
Moneylenders also used other tactics: refusing receipts, entering false figures in bonds, acquiring harvests at low prices, and eventually taking peasants' property (Source 9 describes how deeds of hire trapped peasants).
Source 9. Deeds of hire
When debts mounted the peasant was unable to pay back the loan to the moneylender. He had no option but to give over all his possessions – land, carts, and animals – to the moneylender. But without animals he could not continue to cultivate. So he took land on rent and animals on hire. He now had to pay for the animals which had originally belonged to him. He had to sign a deed of hire stating very clearly that these animals and carts did not belong to him. In cases of conflict, these deeds could be enforced through the court.
The following is the text of a deed that a peasant signed in November 1873, from the records of the Deccan Riots Commission:
I have sold to you, on account of the debt due to you, my two carriages having iron axles, with their appurtenances and four bullocks … I have taken from you on hire under (this) deed the very same two carriages and four bullocks. I shall pay every month the hire thereof at Rupees four a month, and obtain a receipt in your own handwriting. In the absence of a receipt I shall not contend that the hire had been paid.
Answer:
In this deed, the peasant is committing to:
- Confirming the sale of his carriages and bullocks to the moneylender due to outstanding debt.
- Acknowledging that he is hiring back the very same carriages and bullocks from the moneylender.
- Paying a fixed monthly hire rate of Rupees four for the hired items.
- Obtaining a written receipt from the moneylender for each monthly payment.
- Not claiming that the hire was paid if he does not have a receipt in the moneylender's handwriting.
This deed of hire tells us about the relationship between the peasant and the moneylender that it is one of extreme power imbalance and exploitation. The moneylender, having acquired the peasant's vital agricultural assets due to debt, effectively reduced the peasant to a state of dependence where he had to pay rent/hire for the very tools and animals he previously owned. It solidifies the moneylender's ownership and creates a new source of income (hire charges) while keeping the peasant tied to him and dependent for his ability to cultivate.
This deed drastically changes the relationship between the peasant and the bullocks (and carts). Previously, they were his property, essential for his livelihood, likely treated with care and affection as assets. Now, they belong to the moneylender and are simply tools he hires. He no longer owns them, losing the security and independence that ownership provided. His connection to them is reduced to that of a renter, obligated to pay for their use, highlighting his diminished status and increased vulnerability.
The British emphasis on written contracts made bonds and deeds powerful instruments of oppression. Peasants, often illiterate, were forced to sign documents whose contents they didn't fully understand, fearing the written word but needing loans to survive.
The Deccan Riots Commission
The spread of the Deccan revolt alarmed the Government of India, prompting it to pressure the Government of Bombay to establish a commission of enquiry. This Deccan Riots Commission investigated the causes of the riots, submitting a report to the British Parliament in 1878.
The Deccan Riots Report is a key source for studying the revolt. The commission conducted enquiries in riot-affected districts, recorded statements from ryots, sahukars, and witnesses, collected statistical data (revenue rates, prices, interest), and collated reports from district collectors. (Fig 9.20 shows a rural scene by William Prinsep).
However, like other official sources, this report reflects official concerns and interpretations. The commission was tasked to determine if government revenue demand caused the revolt. It concluded that moneylenders, not the government demand, were to blame. This finding aligns with a common tendency in colonial records to avoid attributing popular discontent to government policies.
Official reports are invaluable but must be read cautiously and compared with other sources like newspapers, unofficial accounts, legal records, and oral testimonies to gain a comprehensive historical understanding.